Three problems with lighting control at Iroquois Theater that increased death count

Lighting control problem 1

Poorly engineered lamp

Klaw and Erlanger's lighting manufacturing division back in New York married a hooded arc lamp to a spotlight to result in a single fixture with two lamp heads that could be operated by one man on a narrow bridge.   It was probably wired for AC or DC, to accommodate the various cities in which Mr. Bluebeard was expected to perform, and the carbon rods were probably hand fed.  Its engineers may have patted themselves on the back for its space-saving footprint, ideally suited for a bridge, and a single operator.  There was a flaw in the design, however:  at the Iroquois the lamp was too close to to a nearby curtain and could not be lowered.  The spotlight on the mounting post constrained height adjustment of the arc lamp portion that created the risk.  On December 30, 1903 arch-curtain fabric (4th curtain in line behind the fire curtain, testified one stage worker), wafted too close to the sparking arc* and caught fire. In seconds, flames raced up and across, igniting adjacent curtains in the loft above the stage.  In court later there would be much discussion, and little agreement, as to who was responsible for preventing that fabric from being so close to the arc.  Operator William McMullen testified that he'd notified a supervisor about the problem but the supervisor denied it.  Another stage worker confirmed McMullen's claim.  It was also implied that the curtain wafting was the result of unnecessary drafts from the opening of the stage door as employees went out to smoke and/or go to a nearby tavern to get an early start on holiday celebrations.  That one probably came from the same folks who blamed the back draft on performers and stage workers who fled the fire through the stage door.  Like they were supposed to stay on their dressing rooms and burn.  It was a bad lamp for the task, morons.  Had K&E's Mr. Bluebeard not been such a poor profit producer it would have been on the road longer and instead of the Iroquois, the disaster might instead have been in Poughkeepsie, Cedar Rapids or never.  A far better managed and equipped theater than the Iroquois would have been as vulnerable to a stage fire that started high off the ground, far out of the reach of interior fire hoses.

Long story short: Six hundred people died because a lot of people gambled on their lives. Decisions about that lamp's proximity to the curtain was just one set of the bad bets made on a best-case scenario, in this case that sparks and fabric would never get close enough together to ignite the fabric.  No short circuits, no wires, no lamp malfunctions. The lamp performed as designed but inherent limitations in the design made it a poor choice for that particular mix of bridge+curtains+cavalier managers.

Lighting control problem 2

Lamp strip impeded fire curtain descent

Two 2' x 20' strip lamps, one on each side of the proscenium opening, each with approximately 30 bulbs, were made of galvanized metal with a convex profile on one side and a reflective liquid mercury painted surface.  The fixtures were mounted to the wall on hinges, designed to be swung into a niche in the wall when not in use, thereby permitting the fire curtain to slide past on its descent.  On 12/30/1903 the strip lamp on the south side of the stage had been properly niched but the strip lamp on the north side of the stage had not, thereby preventing the fire curtain from being lowered to the stage floor on the north side. With help from a cold draft from the stage door behind, the resulting gap beneath the curtain became a wind tunnel through which fire blasted out from the stage out into auditorium and up to vents in back wall of same, killing everything in its path.  Mr. Bluebeard stage manager, William Carlton, usually reminded someone in the crew to close the strip lamps but when the fire broke out, he was at the front of the theater, in the lobby or auditorium.  One man he commonly directed to close the strip lamp, assistant stage manager, William Plunkett, was on the opposite side of the stage when the fire broke out.  Another, Peter O'Day, was also on the opposite side of the stage and testified he was unable to get to the strip lamp after the fire broke out.  At least one stagehand with years of experience in other theaters gave his opinion in court that the strip lamps should have been mounted to portable stands, that niched lamps were unusual and a poor choice.

Iroquois house electrician Thomas Delaney and stagehand Frank Harrison testified that the north side strip lamp was used and open during the scene prior to the Pale Moonlight scene.  Multiple stage workers testified that it was customary to leave the strip lamp's open throughout the performance, turned on or off according to the requirements of the scene.

According to assistant stage carpenter John McCloskey, the fire curtain was lowered at the start of every performance so the strips may only have been closed at the end of a performance, preparatory to lowering the curtain at the beginning of the next performance. 

At the fire, known stagehands who tried desperately to lower the fire curtain were John Dougherty, Frank Shott, Fred Sickinger and Max Mazzanovich.  Doughterty and Shott were on a bridge, the others believed to have been on the stage floor.  When the curtain was in the semi-lowered position, it blocked the view of the men in the loft from seeing those on the floor and visa versa.  Dougherty raised and re-lowered the curtain several times.  Other men used poles to try to push the curtain up and off the top of the strip lamp.  My hypothesis is that the mounting brackets and fasteners at the top had loosened with the first couple hits, so that the light fixture formed a v-shaped crevice with the wall in which the curtain batten became lodged.  The curtain couldn't be raised or lowered, thus the attempt with poles push it up and out of the crevice.  The batten at the bottom of the curtain meant that they weren't contending with flexible drapery such as what hangs in a residential living room but with heavy drape attached to an inflexible rod.^▼1
According to testimony from Max Mazzanovich, when the struggle to lower the fire curtain began, the fire was at the "arch drapery curtain," four curtains behind the fire curtain.

Another man, possibly Shott, removed what was described as a "hitch pin" (aka linch pin) from the strip lamp, but the lamp still could not be closed.  That may have made the situation worse.  See illustration below for one speculation.

Working blindfolded and deafened

While working the rigging in the loft, John Dougherty, the man raising and lowering the curtain, could not see the strip lamp because his view of it was blocked by the curtain.  Nor could he hear instructions shouted at him from workers on the stage floor: over a thousand people were shouting and stamping and on their feet, fleeing the auditorium.  A fire was crackling high above in the loft, burning scenery drops.  He testified that he did not know what was blocking the curtain's descent as he frantically hauled at the rigging, raising and lowering it, and only learned of it after the fire.

Surrounded by blazing curtains and scenery, the heat growing stronger by the second, their sight obscured by smoke, shouting to one another, trying to be heard over the screams from the auditorium and behind them on the stage, this handful of workers tried desperately to do the right thing.  They failed but it was a heroic effort.

Twenty years later such hinged strip lamps were still being marketed.  Presumably stage managers learned from the Iroquois Theater fire.

Lighting control problem 3

Lights out

The Iroquois was well enough lit but the auditorium and lobby lights depended upon electricity and had no battery backups.  When flames and heat on the stage peaked, it destroyed wiring to the electrical control panel on the stage through which all the electricity in the auditorium flowed. (See inset below.)  That wiring failure instantly took out every light fixture and plunged the theater into blackness.

At high noon, muted daylight would have come through stained glass panels in skylights over the auditorium, and from windows around the ceiling in the lobby. At the height of the fire, however, sunset was 30 minutes off.  Whatever minimal amount of daylight found its way into the theater would have been overpowered by the smoke in the air.   Initially the fire raged in the loft, high above the stage floor, consuming hanging drops.  By the time it dropped to floor level scenery where it could provide illumination to the auditorium, only minutes remained before the back draft hurled the fireball into the auditorium.

Discrepancies and addendum

An irresponsible newspaper and stage worker named Alexander Johnson muddied the water about the cause of the Iroquois Theater fire for over a century.  Before testimony from William McMullen who was operating the lamp that started the fire, and stage workers who actually saw the fire ignite, and workers with hands-on experience operating stage lamps, the Inter Ocean newspaper magnified the words of a scenery painter who knew nothing about lamps and did not see the fire start.  That erroneous testimony has lingered for over a century and still pops up in contemporary accounts. 

Johnson (the court spelled it Johnston) testified on January 7, 1907 at the coroner's inquest, questioned by deputy coroner Lawrence Buckley.  Johnson's testimony was comprised of other people's words rather than first-hand observation but that didn't prevent the Inter- Ocean newspaper from running many column inches of his speculations, then summarizing it inaccurately and declaring it the final word.  According to Johnson, a guide wire for one of the curtains came into contact with an unspecified portion of the spot light, causing a short circuit that sparked, catching drapery afire.  The Ocean conflated the inaccurate theory by declaring that the errant guide wire was attached to the fire curtain.

It was the nature of carbon arc rods to spark and the Iroquois wasn't the only theater that burned as a result of arc sparks igniting curtains or scenery.  They weren't the gentle sparks of a child's July 4th sparkler but 110 volts dancing between rods of carbon. The cause of the start of the Iroquois Theater fire was no more complicated than a fire erupting if you wave a silk handkerchief with frayed edges through a candle flame.

Johnson's testimony:

In 1903 more attention was paid to the properties of the fire curtain fabric than to the man, Bluebeard's stage manager William Carlton, who failed to make sure the proscenium light strips were closed and tucked into their niches after EVERY use.  Like dozens of others, Carlton knew his failure to do so jeopardized fire safety but gambled a fire would not break out.
As demonstrated by fire engineer John Ripley Freeman, a historically important figure in early fire prevention, in the case of the Iroquois Theater, the mix of fire+cold back draft+curtain-gap produced an explosive ball of fire that could not have been sustained for long by even a solid steel curtain but it would have been slowed, causing more damage in upper-floor dressing rooms, but giving more audience members time to escape.
Freeman's report is interesting.  The original, including his photos and fire curtain samples, are at MIT.

1.  Today battens are made of steel but in 1903 many were still made of wood, despite Chicago's fire ordinance mandating steel.  The matter of battens came up in the first days after the fire.  See remarks from Building Department commissioner George Williams at right.  The discussion relates to frequently changed scenery drops, however, excluding the fire curtain that would rarely require changing.

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